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Abstract 
A global forest convention has been advocated for about 15 years, but progress is slow and 
positions of advocates and opponents appear entrenched. We review several case studies and 
offer new empirical evidence relating to causes of and remedies for deforestation. We find no 
evidence to suggest that a forest convention will be effective in halting deforestation. Our 
data indicate that development assistance may be most effective approach to save forests in 
developing countries. It appears that "money speaks louder than words". We conclude that a 
global forest convention will be ineffective unless accompanied by substantial and well-
directed development assistance. 
 
Introduction 
A global forest convention was first proposed in 1990, in the Sào Paulo Declaration of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and in a review of the Tropical Forests 
Action Plan. These proposals were quickly followed by calls by the President G. H.W. Bush 
(1990) and from the G7 (the Group of Seven, comprising the heads of state of the seven 
major industrial democracies) for a "global forest convention or agreement ... to curb 
deforestation, protect biodiversity, stimulate positive forestry actions and address threats to 
the world's forests". It became a North-South issue, with many industrialized countries 
favoring a binding agreement while many developing countries and non-government 
organizations (NGOs) protested the possible infringement of sovereign rights. At the Earth 
Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, a binding agreement could not be reached, and the 
compromise was a "Non-binding authoritative statement on forest principles". Negotiations 
continued fruitlessly under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF) and 
its successor the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF). More recently, the United 
Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) was established by the UN Economic and Social Council 
(2000) with the responsibility to recommend, by the year 2005, "the parameters of a mandate 
for developing a legal framework on all types of forests". Discussions have continued, but 
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progress toward a conclusion has been imperceptible. The global forest convention appears to 
be a solution looking for a problem. 
So what is the problem? It is clear that the world continues to lose forests, with an average of 
9 million hectares per year deforested during 1990-2000, and with deforestation rates in 
excess of 5% per year in Haiti and Burundi (FAO 2001). Why does the world continue to lose 
forest, and how would a global convention help? Advocates of a convention argue that it 
would ensure that all of the world's forests are sustainably managed for their many goods and 
services, provide the basis for a common understanding of sustainable forest management 
concepts, and establish the legal framework for monitoring and compliance (e.g., Roberts 
2003). Critics of a convention argue that the proposed convention addresses the wrong issues, 
and does not provide an adequate means to regulate the private sector (e.g., Jeanrenaud et al 
1997). Both proponents and opponents share some common concerns, namely the underlying 
issues of deforestation, the loss of biodiversity and habitat, and the loss of wilderness. For 
some, timber harvesting is seen as the primary cause of deforestation, and the central issue of 
the convention. This is wrong; timber harvesting is not synonymous with forest loss. While it 
is true that timber harvesting may reduce wilderness values, well-managed timber harvests 
need not conflict with conservation and recreation. 
Forest loss through conversion to other land uses is a major concern, as it does cause habitat 
and biodiversity loss. However, timber harvesting is not the primary cause of forest loss, and 
need not cause forest loss at all. The timber industry has been a favorite target of NGOs for 
many years, but there has recently been some recognition that other forces may be more 
destructive of forests. Conservation International has promoted a strategy of a single harvest 
followed by preservation (Rice et al 1998), and the World Wildlife Fund have recently 
warned that land clearing, not production forestry, was the greatest threat to biodiversity in 
the Australian state of Tasmania (WWF 2004).  
 
Empirical Evidence and Case studies 
There are many ways to examine the interaction of deforestation, timber harvesting and 
socio-economic issues, and empirical analyses, case studies, and logical reasoning can all 
contribute to our understanding. We will explore all of these, and begin with an empirical 
analysis of the latest global assessment of forests (FAO 2001).The Forest Resource 
Assessment 2000 (FRA2000, conducted by FAO, the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations), collated national data on forest area, deforestation and some socio-
economic trends, and offers some interesting insights into deforestation patterns in some 200 
countries during 1990-2000. A simple correlation study of the FRA2000 data reveals only 
two significant correlations with deforestation rate: GNP/capita and rural population (%), 
both of which are highly significant (P<0.01). Population density, population growth rate, the 
growth rate of the economy (GDP), national debt and inflation rate are not significantly 
correlated with national deforestation (when analyzed at the global scale). Countries with 
large rural populations or low household incomes (GNP/capita) tend to have high 
deforestation rates. A line fitted to the GNP data suggests that countries with less than 
US$4400 GNP/capita tend to deforest; those with more than US$4400 GNP/capita tend to 
reforest (Brazil, Chile and Malaysia are just above this threshold; Trinidad is below). 
Similarly, a line fitted to the rural population data suggests that deforestation tends to happen 
in countries where the rural population is more than 35% of the total population; it is likely 
that this reflects the greater employment opportunities in urban areas than in subsistence 
agriculture.
Figure 1. Annual change in forest area (%) versus GNP per capita (US$, left) and rural 
population (%). Drawn from FRA2000 data (FAO 2001). 
This empirical evidence of a link between poverty and deforestation is supported by other 
studies. For instance, Arnold (2001) offered a comprehensive review of the links between 
poverty, deforestation and biodiversity loss. It is likely that deforestation will not be arrested 
unless poverty is also addressed, something not proposed for the convention. Increasing the 
average GNP per capita of all forested nations to US$4400 will require more than a 
convention; it will require a bold commitment akin to that proposed by Secretary of State 
General George Marshall (1947) to help Europe recover after World War II (in which the 
USA pledged 2-3% of its GDP in economic aid over 5 years). 
Sobral Filho (2001) offered a case study to illustrate the influence of alternative employment 
on deforestation. He drew a comparison between deforestation rates in Mato Grosso and 
Amazonas, both of which are states of Brazil with substantial areas of tropical forest (44% 
and 90% respectively). Mato Grosso is losing forest at 660,000 ha per year (despite timber 
earnings of only US$200 million: at $300/ha, an indication that timber earnings are unlikely 
to be the driver for this deforestation), whereas Amazonas has relatively little deforestation. 
The forests in Amazonas remain, in part, because the state capital Manaus was granted tax-
free status by Brazil's federal government in 1968, and this initiative stimulated the 
development of electronics industries. The tax-free industry, which receives incentives and 
subsidies of US$3 billion annually, is the only development engine in the state. It is the major 
employer of the local people, who flocked to Manaus, now home to 60% of the state’s two 
million inhabitants. The tax-free status was not granted to conserve forest; it was to establish 
a presence in northern regions of Brazil for security reasons, but the result has been that the 
forest has been maintained: people prefer to work for wages in a factory, than to eke out a 
living through subsistence farming in tropical forests. Sadly, Brazil's 1988 constitution states 
that the tax-free status of Manaus will end in 2007, and it will be interesting to observe the 
fate of the Amazonas forest at that time. However, the Manaus case study provides 
compelling evidence that the provision of alternative employment opportunities can be an 
effective way to retain forest. Similarly urbanization, rising living standards and out-
migration have taken pressure off forests in places like Puerto Rico and Costa Rica. Although 
high rural populations are correlated with deforestation we do not want to encourage even 
more movement into the vast slums of the developing world (see Davis 2004 for an eloquent 
commentary of these urban problems). Rather we advocate policies that stabilize rural 
populations, promote sustainable land uses, and foster alternative employment opportunities. 












































There appears to be a third major factor at work in facilitating deforestation, namely 
corruption. Transparency International compile annual statistics on corruption in 133 
countries, and there is a significant correlation between deforestation and their corruption 
perception index (an index of corruption, with 0=corrupt, 10=honest; Transparency 
International 2003). These data show that the rate of deforestation tends to increase with 
corruption (with Brazil again on the threshold between deforestation and afforestation). Many 
case studies support the contention that deforestation and corruption go hand-in-hand (e.g., 
Laurance et al 2001). For example, three-fourths of Indonesia’s timber trade is illegal (Speth 
2004), often quite openly so (Jepson et al 2001). 
Figure 2. Corruption and the change of forest area. 
While there are instances where deforestation is a direct result of a deliberate government 
policy, it is more common for deforestation to occur as an unintended side-effect of other 
policies (e.g., to stimulate agricultural production), or to occur despite government policy, 
because of poverty, a lack of alternatives, and because of corruption. A forest instrument will 
not change these issues, which requires more concerted and practical action. Transparency 
International (2003) identified political parties, the courts and the police as the three areas 
most in need of reform in countries beset with corruption. They also called for greater 
transparency in public contracting (especially in dealings with the oil industry). Peter Eigen, 
chairman of TI, called on rich countries to provide practical support to developing country 
governments that demonstrate the political will to curb corruption. 
The Annual Review and Assessment of the World Timber Situation (ITTO 2003) offers more 
insights into the timber industry. These data reveal that four nations play a pivotal role in the 
tropical timber trade, and reveal that a forest convention dealing with production forests in 
the tropics will be inconsequential unless it gains the support of Indonesia and Malaysia 
(major exporters), and of China and Japan (major importer). The data illustrated in Figure 3 
relate only to primary wood products (logs, sawnwood, veneer, plywood); there is also a large 
trade in secondary processed wood products (Table 1). 





















Table 1. The value of international trade in secondary processed wood products from tropical 
forests (ITTO 2003). 
Exporting country (Value in US$million)  
Importing country China Indonesia Malaysia ITTO Producers 
USA 3,571 718 504 2,597 
European Union 947 982 306 2,052 
Japan 937 356 244 980 
ITTO Consumers 6,919 2,222 1,207 6,176 
 
Despite the economic importance of tropical forestry (Table 1), timber production is in many 
cases, less profitable than agricultural alternatives. For instance Sobral Filho (2001) reports 
that in Brazil, the annual per hectare value of soy bean production exceeds the value timber 
production ten-fold, so it is no surprise that forests are cleared for agricultural production. 
Mato Grosso, the second largest state in the Brazilian Amazon, has become the largest 
producer of soybeans in Brazil, with 3 million hectares under this crop. It is also the second 
largest producer of rice and cotton (Sobral Filho 2001). The Federal Agriculture Research 
Agency estimates that 40 million additional hectares of forested land are suitable for these 
land uses and the state supports the conversion of this forest to agriculture. 
 
Circumstances for Sustainable Forestry 
So far, we have examined situations that conspire to deforest. It is instructive to examine the 
other side of the coin, and to consider the circumstances which foster sustainable forestry, 
especially continuous cover forestry which may be especially compatible with biodiversity 
conservation and is favored by many NGOs. In an unregulated environment, continuous 
cover forestry tends to occur only where land use pressure is modest and land rights are 
recognized (Table 2). 
Table 2. Security, competition and forest use 
Security (time horizon & tenure) Competition 
for land Weak Strong 
Low Deforest: abandon Continuous cover forestry 
High Deforest: mixed cropping Deforest: monoculture 
 
In Table 2, "security" implies tenure (freehold, leasehold, concession), the formal time 
horizon (length of lease or concession) and economic time horizon (which may depend on the 
discount rate and whether returns are periodic or annual). Competition for land relates to the 
pressure from competing land uses; these may be low in remote areas (e.g., parts of the 
Amazon and Kalimantan that are far from roads and rivers), but are high where population 
density is high (e.g., Bangladesh), or where the land is accessible and arable (e.g., Mato 
Grosso, and the Bolivian State of Santa Cruz; Kaimowitz et al 2002). We could also add 
another axis, namely scale of operation, including both the area involved, and the capital 
resources available to the venture. As scale increases, the amount and the rate of deforestation 
tend to increase. 
Weak security encourages deforestation because the present value of a harvest is greater than 
the discounted value of on-going returns from the forest. In addition, security can sometimes 
be strengthened by clearing (e.g., ability to claim land ownership in parts of the Brazil 
Amazon). In other situations, security can be increased by non-timber products that improve 
the flow of benefits from the forest. For example, forests in Germany (and elsewhere in 
Europe) tend to be managed more conservatively and with longer rotations, because the 
stream of annual revenues from hunting rights often exceeds the discounted value of the 
timber harvests. When competition for land is high, landholders (if motivated by profit) tend 
to strive for the highest-value land use, and monocultures (agricultural, Eucalyptus, Pinus, 
etc.) are usually more profitable than continuous cover forestry. 
 
The way forward 
How can we favor continuous cover forestry (CCF)? A focus on the "triple bottom line" 
(social, ecological and economic performance, rather than the financial cash flow position) 
would certainly help to favor CCF. The creation of jobs in non-agricultural sectors is a 
proven way to reduce land use pressure. Boosting agricultural production is a two-edged 
sword; in subsistence communities it may reduce the demand for land, but in cash-cropping 
communities, it may make it profitable to farm even more marginal land. Dumping of 
subsidized agricultural surpluses destabilizes local production systems, destroying 
employment opportunities and stimulating the agricultural expansion for cash cropping (note 
that the US Farm Bill provides a subsidy of $180 billion annually to US farmers). Another 
reliable approach is to make CCF more profitable, so that it competes more favorably with 
monocultures; this can be achieved by paying landholders for environmental services offered 
by forests (biodiversity and carbon credits), and charging plantations (agricultural as well as 
forest plantations) the full costs of externalities. A key part of this solution is to minimize the 
transaction costs; in Australia there is much bureaucracy involved in forest regulation, but 
little in agriculture; this incurs a high transaction cost for CCF. Sobral Filho (2001) observed 
that in Mato Grosso, credit for soybean projects could be secured within 2 months, but that 
sustainable forestry projects typically took 18 months to secure government loans. 
The situation of socio-economic disarray in some developing countries is not so different to 
that of Europe after World War II. At that time, General George Marshall recognized the 
gravity of the situation and initiated a bold plan that was pivotal in Europe's development. 
The peace, prosperity and unity (and stable forest area) today among the nations that 
benefited from the Marshall Plan are testimony to the wisdom of the plan. Apart from the 
word "Europe", much of Marshall's (1947) speech remains relevant today in the context of 
developing countries, so we reproduce a large excerpt. Marshall (1947) noted that "… people 
of this country are distant from the troubled areas of the earth and it is hard for them to comprehend 
the plight … visible destruction was probably less serious than the dislocation of the entire fabric of 
European economy … So the governments are forced to use their foreign money and credits to procure 
these necessities abroad. This process exhausts funds which are urgently needed for reconstruction. … 
Europe's requirements … are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have 
substantial additional help, or face economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave 
character. The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the European 
people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole. The manufacturer and 
the farmer throughout wide areas must be able and willing to exchange their products for currencies 
the continuing value of which is not open to question. Aside from the demoralizing effect on the world 
at large and the possibilities of disturbances arising as a result of the desperation of the people 
concerned, the consequences to the economy of the United States should be apparent to all. It is 
logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal 
economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. 
Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, 
and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of working economy in the world so as to permit the 
emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. … to alleviate the 
situation and help start the European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement 
among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries 
themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this 
Government. It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up 
unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the 
Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe…".  With the benefit of hindsight, most 
observers would agree that the Marshall plan was remarkably successful (for both Europe and 
the USA alike), but some key reasons for this success are often overlooked. Marshall quite 
deliberately created the opportunity, incentive and freedom for neighboring countries to work 
together and become responsible for their own future. It seems that this lesson was not 
adopted in the Tropical Forestry Action Plans of the 1980s (Winterbottom 1990), and has not 
always been evident in development assistance programs. 
Our argument, that "money speaks louder than words", has some empirical support. The 
FRA200 deforestation rates in tropical countries are significantly correlated with the number 
of key environmental treaties signed (Figure 4; Vanclay 2004). The treaties examined were 
eight of the ten treaties identified by Ruis (2001) as key forest-related treaties (Convention on 
Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, 1971; Convention on the 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna, 1973; Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987; Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992; United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992; International Tropical Timber Agreement, 
1994; United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries experiencing Serious 
Drought and/or Desertification, particularly in Africa, 1994; Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1998). One explanation for this correlation is that 
countries which have become party to these treaties are those with the greatest problems, and 
that deforestation rates under these treaties are less than what would have prevailed 
otherwise. However, it seems more likely that many countries are either not taking their 
environmental commitments seriously, or do not have the resources needed to tackle the 
problem. There is also some evidence (P=0.10) that deforestation decreases with increasing 
development assistance (US$/capita, as tabulated in CIA 2004), even though much of this 
assistance may be outside the forestry and environmental sectors (Table 4). These data 
suggest that aid does help, and treaties do not help, to combat deforestation. Of course, 
money alone is not enough; it needs to be targeted appropriately, towards nations that 
demonstrate the will, towards where it can most help the poor, and in ways that give an 
incentive for all individuals to improve their own situation (Easterly 2001).  
Clearly, the investment required to reverse deforestation would be considerable. One way to 
amass the funding needed to support such a development effort, could be through a currency 
transactions tax, long advocated by Nobel-prize winner and Yale University economist James 
Tobin (1978) for the stabilizing effect such a tax would have on currency markets. In addition 
to its calming effect on financial markets, a Tobin tax would raise over US$100 billion per 
year, enough to provide food security, health and education for the world's poor, as well as 
















































4. Change in forest area (%/year during 1990-2000) in 106 tropical countries versus 
development assistance (US$/capita/yr, left) and number of environmental treaties signed 
(right; score 1.0 for party to, and 0.5 for signing but not ratifying, each of 8 environmental 
treaties). 
Conclusion 
What would a global forest convention do for tropical forests, in the light of these underlying 
problems? It appears that a convention as currently proposed would be ineffective, unless 
underpinned by a strong commitment, and substantial funding, to foster socio-economic 
development of developing countries with forest resources. Sadly, this appears unlikely 
(Speth 2004:p.110).   
What would a "Marshall Plan" for forests mean for the USA and other consumers of tropical 
timbers? A serious commitment to assist economic and social development in forested 
countries could do much to maintain forest cover. It is possible that such an initiative could 
increase the cost and constrain the supply of tropical timber, but it would guarantee the 
continuity of supply, so that our children will also enjoy tropical timber and forests (and 
orangutans, gorillas and other tropical forest dependent fauna). Experience with the original 
Marshall Plan suggests that such an initiative may also bring many other benefits, to both 
donor and recipient communities. 
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